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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal arises from the district court's summary judgment in favor of a property
owner determining its real property was not subject to the claim of a materialmen's lien.
At the request of a developer, TMC Contractors, Inc., performed work to grade and
pave a private drive and parking spaces in Taylorview Development. Draw, LLC, owned real
property within that development, including an easement interest in the private drive.
After completing its work, TMC was not fully paid. It recorded a materialmen's lien
against all real property within the development. TMC later assigned its lien to Intermountain
Real Properties, LLC.
Initially, the district court determined the developer was not an agent for Draw for
purposes of establishing a nexus between TMC's work and Draw and determined Draw's
property was not within Taylorview Development. Upon Intermountain's motion for
reconsideration, the district court again determined Draw's property was not within
Taylorview Development; thus, the materialmen's lien was not enforceable against Draw's
property. Additionally, the district court ordered Intermountain to pay some of Draw's
attorney fees finding the claims arose from a commercial transaction.
This appeal followed the district court's denial of Intermountain's motion for
reconsideration.
Course of the Proceedings
TMC filed a Complaint to foreclose its materialmen's lien on July 23, 2009. (Clerk's
Record, pp.16-29).
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Draw filed an Answer on September 3,2009. (Clerk's Record, pp. 59-61).
After receiving TMC's assignment of its claim and action, Intermountain filed a
verified Amended Complaint. (Clerk's Record, pp. 38-54).
On March 5, 2010 Intermountain filed its motion and memorandum for summary
judgment against Draw and others. (Clerk's Record, p. 5 - ROA Report).
Draw filed no response to Intermountain's motion. (Clerk's Record, pp. 5-6, 82-83).
Intermountain obtained summary judgment against Draw on April 19,2010. (Clerk's

Record, pp. 82-83).
After a sheriff's sale upon writ of execution in November 2010, Draw filed a motion
for relief from judgment on December 17,2010. (Clerk's Record, p. 7 - ROA Report).
Intermountain filed its objection to Draw's motion on January 17, 2011. (Clerk's

Record, 8 - ROA Report).
The district court heard Draw's motion for relief on January 31, 2011. (Clerk's

Record, p. 8 - ROA Report).
By order filed April 12, 2011 the district court granted Draw's motion for relief.

(Clerk's Record, p. 8 - ROA Report).
Draw filed its Amended Answer and Counterclaim on September 6, 2011. (Clerk's

Record, pp. 92-101).
Intermountain filed its Reply to Draw's Counterclaim on October 13, 2011. (Clerk's

Record, pp. 102-103).
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On March 6, 2012, Draw filed its motion for summary judgment. (Clerk's Record, p.
8 - ROA Report).
Intermountain on April 6, 2012 filed its response in opposition to Draw's motion
supported by affidavits of Shawn Allen and Sandy Gaydusek. (Clerk's Record, pp. 105-113).
Hearing before the district court on Draw's motion for summary judgment was held
April 30, 2012. (Transcript of Hearing, Motionfor Summary Judgment, pp. 5-56).
The district court on May 25, 2012 entered its Order Granting Draw's motion for
summary judgment. (Clerk's Record, pp.175-195).
Judgment for Draw was entered June 7, 2012 and certified as a final judgment.

(Clerk's Record, pp.200-202).
On June 19, 2012 Intermountain filed a motion for reconsideration together with an
affidavit of Robert Butler in support of the motion. (Clerk's Record, pp. 220-221; 223-226).
On June 13,2012 Draw filed a motion and memorandum for costs and fees. (Clerk's

Record, p. 14 - ROA Report).
Intermountain filed on June 19, 2012 its objection to Draw's motion for costs and
fees. (Clerk's Record, pp. 232-235).
Hearing on Intermountain' motion for reconsideration was held July 9, 2012.

(Transcript of Hearing, Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 5-49).
On August 23, 2012 the district court filed its Order denying Intermountain' motion
for reconsideration and awarding Draw partial fees. (Clerk's Record, pp. 236-260).
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Judgment on attorney fees for Draw was entered August 30, 2012. (Clerk's Record,
pp. 284-285).
Intermountain timely filed notice of appeal on September 17, 2012. (Clerk's Record,
pp.287-289).

Statement of the Facts
The following salient facts are derived from the affidavits and pleadings of record.
Intermountain Real Properties, LLC, is an Idaho limited liability company and the
assignee ofTMC Contractors, Inc.'s, materialmen's lien. (Clerk's Record, pp. 37-53).
Shawn Allen was the owner and developer of Taylorview Development in Bingham
County, Idaho. (Clerk's Record, pp. 138-142).
Kevin Taggatijoined Allen in developing Taylorview Development. (Clerk's Record,
pp. 138-142)
Allen sold to Taggart through Taggart's entity, Timberline, several parcels within
Taylorview Development. (Clerk's Record, pp. 138-142). In turn, Taggart through
Timberline sold a parcel to Draw. (Clerk's Record, pp. 138-142; 223-226).
Draw's real property consists of a parcel of undeveloped land together with an
easement interest in a private drive accessing Draw's property from a public street. (Clerk's
Record, pp. 138-142; 223-226). Draw's parcel and the concomitant private drive are situated
wholly within Taylorview Development. (Clerk's Record, pp. 223-226).
During their development of Taylorview Development, Allen and Taggart hired TMC
to perform the work necessary to grade and pave the private drive and parking spaces within
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the development. (Clerk's Record, pp. 138-142). TMC performed the requested paving work.

(Clerk's Record, pp. 138-142; 144-156).
In addition to having the private drive paved, Allen improved a spur road on land
owned by the City of Shelley. (Clerk's Record, pp. 138-142; 144-156).
When its bill was not fully paid, TMC recorded a materialmen's lien against all real
property in Taylorview Development, including Draw's parcel. (Clerk's Record, pp.l6-29).
TMC assigned all of its rights under the materialmen's lien and its foreclosure action
to Intermountain. (Clerk's Record, p. 45).

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Did the district court err in disregarding the positive testimony found in the affidavit
of Robert Butler proving Draw's real property was within Taylorview Development?
Did the district court err as a matter of law in awarding Draw some of its attorney
fees based upon I.C. § 12-120(3) finding there was a commercial transaction between TMC
and Draw?

Appellant's Brief - Page 5

ARGUMENT
A.

The District Court erred in disregarding positive testimony found in the affidavit of

Robert Butler proving Draw's real property was within Taylorview Development.
Standard of Review

When reviewing a district court's summary judgment, the standard of review on
appeal is the same standard as that used by the district court in ruling on the motion.
Summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." LR.C.P. 56(c).
Disputed facts should be construed in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving
party. The appellate court exercises free review over questions of law.
Castorena v. General Electric, 149 Idaho 609, 613, 238 P.3d 209,213 (2010).
Argument

The purpose of Idaho's mechanics' and materialmen's lien statutes is to compensate
persons who perform labor and provide materials for improvements to or upon real property.
See generally BMC West Corp. v. Horkley, 144 Idaho 890, 893-94, 174 P.3d 399, 402-03
(2007).

Idaho's appellate courts have historically construed materialmen's lien laws

"liberally in favor of the person who performs labor upon or furnishes materials" used in
making improvements to real property. Id. Specific language in Idaho's Constitution
guarantees such interest where it states, "[t]he legislature shall provide by proper legislation
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for giving to mechanics, laborers, and material men an adequate lien on the subject matter of
their labor." IDAHO CONST. art. XIII, § 6.
Idaho Code § 45-501 creates two distinct types of liens- a lien against some form of
structure, alternately referred to in later sections of the lien law as an "improvement," and a
lien created in favor of one who improves the land, itself, by grading, leveling, and the like.

Hopkins Northwest Fund, LLC v. Landscapes Unlimited, LLC, 151 Idaho 740, 264 P.3d 379
(2011).
That same statute provides, "any person having charge .. .in whole or in part, of any
building or other improvement, as aforesaid, shall be held to be the agent of the owner for the
purpose of this chapter. ... " Under I.C. § 45-504, any person who, at the request of the owner
of any lot in any incorporated city or town, surveys, grades, fills in, or otherwise improves
the same or the street in front of or adjoining the same, has a lien upon such lot for his work
done or material furnished.
The district court committed two errors in reaching its decision granting summary
judgment to Draw:

1) it failed to apply the clear language of § 45-501; and 2) on

Intermountain's motion for reconsideration, it disregarded positive testimony of Robert
Butler establishing Draw's parcel as being part of Taylorview Development.
As developers of Taylorview Development, Allen and Taggart were persons "having
charge ... in whole or in part, of any building or other improvement" and "shall be held to be
the agent of the owner for the purpose of this chapter. ... " I.C. § 45-501. The district court did
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not consider that aspect of the materialmen's lien statute in making its decision because it
instead held Draw's parcel was not within Taylorview Development.
The affidavit of Allen was not contradicted by Draw in any manner. Allen's
testimony established that the private drive was paved at his or Taggart's direction as the
developer and owner of the property. Although there was no clear agency nexus established
between Draw and Allen or Taggart for purposes of establishing contractual liability, the
applicable statute deems Allen and Taggart shall be the agents of Draw for purposes of the
private drive.
In its decision granting Draw's motion for summary judgment, the district court
reached a finding that the evidence before it did not clearly show Draw's parcel was part of
Taylorview Development. Accordingly, Intermountain filed a motion for reconsideration,
which motion was supported by the affidavit of Robert Butler. Butler was the surveying
engineer who prepared the Record of Survey for Taylorview Development. In addition, he
prepared the legal descriptions for the respective parcels within the Development. Those
legal descriptions were used in conveying title to Draw and other purchasers.
Butler affirmatively testified that, "All of the property described in the deed to Draw
lies within the Record of Survey for Taylorview Development." (Clerk's Record, p. 223226).
Despite Butler's testimony, the district court on reconsideration focused erroneously
on a "black line which appears to define the boundaries of the Taylorview Development."
(Clerk's Record, p. 142). Further compounding that error, the district court examined a tax
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parcel map from the Bingham County Assessor's Office and made the following factual
determination. "That document also shows a black line around celiain parcels of real estate,
but excludes Draw's Property from the group." (Clerk's Record, p. 142). The Assessor's tax
plat contained no information on its face concerning the line depictions given on the plat. Nor
was there any affidavit upon which the district court could rely for explaining the "black
lines" on that plat. (Clerk's Record, p. 142).
Implied, if not expressed, within the district court's decision is a factual finding that
the "black lines" seen on the record of survey and Assessor's plat are the actual boundary
lines for Taylorview Development. That finding is not supported by any factual evidence. To
the contrary, the evidence before the court shows Draw's parcel lies within the development.
Nevertheless, the district court relied upon the "black lines" to reach its determination
that Draw's parcel was not located in Taylorview Development. Seemingly avoiding its
judicial obligation to liberally construe § 45-501 in favor of Intermountain, the district court
opted instead to find Draw's parcel was not part of Taylorview Development. Consequently,
the district court denied Intermountain's motion for reconsideration.
Idaho has long followed the legal principal that positive testimony cannot be
disregarded by a trial court or jury in favor of unsupported testimony or evidence. Pierstorif
v. Gray's Auto Shop, 58 Idaho 438, 447-48, 74 P.2d 171, 175 (1937); Dinneen v. Finch, 603

P.2d 575, 582, 100 Idaho 620, 625 (1979).
"The rule was recently announced by this court that the court must accept as true the
positive, uncontradicted testimony of a credible witness, unless his testimony is inherently
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improbable, or rendered so by facts and circumstances disclosed at the hearing or the trial
and that the trial court may not arbitrarily or capriciously disregard the testimony of a witness
unimpeached by any of the modes known to the law, if such testimony does not exceed
probability." First Trust & Savings Bank v. Randall, 59 Idaho 705, 715, 89 P.2d 741 (1939).
A court "must accept as true the positive, uncontradicted testimony of a credible witness,
unless his testimony is inherently improbable or rendered so by facts and circumstances
disclosed at the hearing." Dinneen v. Finch, 603 P.2d 575, 582,100 Idaho 620, 625 (1979).
In that connection, the Idaho Supreme Court has instructively held that when
considering motions for summary judgment the trial court should apply the following
standard:
In this process the Court must look to the "totality of the motions, affidavits,
depositions, pleadings, and attached exhibits," not merely to portions of the
record in isolation. Central Idaho Agency, supra, 92 Idaho at 310, 442 P.2d at
446. Circumstantial evidence can create a genuine issue of material fact.
"[A]ll doubts are to be resolved against the moving party." The motion must
be denied "if the evidence is such that conflicting inferences can be drawn
therefrom and if reasonable [people] might reach different conclusions."
Ashby v. Hubbard, 100 Idaho 67, 69, 593 P.2d 402, 404 (1979), citing Petricevich v. Salmon
River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865, 868-69,452 P.2d 362,365-66 (1969).

Accordingly, the district court erred in disregarding the testimony of Robert Butler.
The district court's error was compounded by its isolated reliance on black lines on the
record of survey and a plat from an assessor's office that were unexplained and did not
contain any positive testimony upon which the court could reasonably rely.
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Butler's affidavit contains testimony that is reliable and not inherently improbable.
Butler's testimony cannot be ignored. On the strength of Butler's testimony, Intermountain
proved Draw's parcel was located entirely within Taylorview Development. The evidence
before the district court at least was such that conflicting inferences could be drawn
therefrom, thus constituting a question of fact upon which reasonable minds could differ,
thus, preventing summary judgment.
In addition, the district court overlooked Draw's interest in the easement to the
private road in the development. Not only was Draw's parcel located within Taylorview
Development, but also Draw by deed was granted an easement interest in the private road.
That private road was Draw's access to the public street.
Therefore, the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Draw.
Based on the record on appeal, the district court did not attempt to apply 45-501 to
Intermountain's claim that Allen and or Taggart were persons in charge of the development
and "shall be held" agents of Draw. Consequently, the appellate court does not have
sufficient record to answer that question itself. See Hellickson v. Jenkins, 118 Idaho 273, 796
P.2d 150 (Ct. App. 1990). Remand is required to allow the district court to consider
application of 45-50 1 to the facts presented on summary judgment.
"Where an appellate court reverses or vacates a judgment upon an issue properly
raised, and remands for further proceedings, it may give guidance for. .. issues on remand."

Clark v. Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 159,45 P.3d 810, 815 (2002); Bratton v. Scott, 150 Idaho 530,
248 P.3d 1265 (2011).
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Intermountain has previously cited the law in Idaho requiring liberal construction of
the materialmen's lien statutes in favor of compensation of those who provide labor and
materials in the improvement of real property. Intermountain invites the Court on appeal to
give direction to the district court on the interpretation of 45-501 where it states "any person
having charge .. .in whole or in part, of any building or other improvement, as aforesaid, shall
be held to be the agent of the owner for the purpose of this chapter .... "
Application of the statute begins with the language at issue: "and every
contractor, subcontractor, architect, builder or any person having charge of ...
the construction, alteration or repair, either in whole or in part, of any building
or other improvement, as aforesaid, shall be held to be the agent of the owner
for the purpose of this chapter." I.e. § 45-501.
Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, statutory
construction is unnecessary, and this Court need only determine the
application of the words to the facts of the case. A statute is ambiguous where
the language is reasonably capable of more than one conflicting construction.
However, "[a]mbiguity is not established merely because differing
interpretations are presented to a court; otherwise, all statutes subject to
litigation would be considered ambiguous." Therefore, "[t]he interpretation
should begin with an examination of the literal words of the statute, and this
language should be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning."

L & W Supply Corp. v. Chartrand Family Trust, 136 Idaho 738, 743, 40 P.3d 96, 101
(2002)( citations omitted).

Construction of a statute is a question of law over which the appellate courts in Idaho
have free review. Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388, 111 P.3d 73
(2005).
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In L& W the court examined the plain language of the statute in question and found
that a supplier was too remote in connection with improvements to constitute a person in
charge for purposes of the materialmen's statute.
In this action, TMC was dealing directly with Allen and Taggart, the two and only
two persons in charge of Taylorview Development. Under the facts set forth in Allen's
affidavit, TMC reasonably relied on Allen and Taggart's positions as developers in agreeing
to grade and pave the private drive. Intermountain believes the Court on appeal can give
guidance on remand to the district court that if it finds Allen and Taggart were persons in
charge of Taylorview Development, it should construe 45-501 in favor ofIntermountain.
The summary judgment in favor of Draw should be vacated. This action should be
remanded to the district court to consider the positive testimony of Butler and then determine
whether there are genuine issues of material fact preventing summary judgment or reverse its
decision and grant summary judgment to Intermountain.

B.

The District Court erred as a matter of law in awarding Draw some of its attorney fees

under I.e. § 12-120(3) finding there was a commercial transaction between TMC and Draw.
Standard of Review

"Whether a district court has correctly determined that a case is based on a
'commercial transaction' for the purpose ofLC. § 12-120(3) is a question oflaw" over which
the appellate court exercises free review. Fritts v. Liddle & Moeller Canst., Inc., 144 Idaho
171, 173, 158 P.3d 947,949 (2007).
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Argument

"Under I.C. § 12-120(3), a prevailing party is entitled to an award of attorney fees if a
'commercial transaction is integral to the claim, and constitutes the basis upon which the
party is attempting to recover.'" Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., Inc., 152 Idaho 741, 744, 274
P.3d 1256, 1269 (2012), quoting Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 728,
152 P .3d 594, 599 (2007). "We today make clear that, in order for a transaction to be
commercial, each party to the transaction must enter the transaction for a commercial
purpose." Id. (Emphasis added).
"It is oft repeated by this Court that, 'If the party is claiming that a statute provides

authority for an award of attorney fees, the party must cite to the statute and, if applicable,
the specific subsection of the statute upon which the party relies.'" Stephen v. Sallaz &

Gatewood, Chtd., 150 Idaho 521, 530,248 P.3d 1256, 1265 (2011).
Draw argued that because Intermountain had alleged in its complaint a contract
existed between TMC and Draw, then Draw could claim for fees based on a contract under

I.e. § 12-120(3) even if the district court did not find a contract existed. Further, Draw urged
the finding that there was a commercial transaction between TMC and Draw. Neither
argument was sound. However, the district court found a commercial transaction was the
gravamen of Intermountain's complaint and, thus, awarded fees. (Clerk's Record, pp. 236260).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that if there was no commercial transaction
between the parties, then 12-120(3) does not apply. "Attorney fees for LU under section
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120(3) are inappropriate in this case because there was no commercial transaction between
Hopkins and LU." Hopkins Northwest Fund, LLC v. Landscapes Unlimited, LLC, 151 Idaho
740, 748, 264 P.3d 379,387 (2011).
Relying on its holding in BECO Canst. Co., Inc. v. J-U-B Eng'rs, Inc., 145 Idaho 719,
726, 184 P.3d 844, 851 (2008), the Court in Hopkins observed that where there is no
"transaction" between the parties, 12-120(3) does not apply. Id. "Therefore, attorney fees
under section 120(3) would be inappropriate." Id.
There was no transaction between TMC and Draw. As determined by the district
court, the transaction was between TMC, Allen and Taggart. Draw prevailed at summary
judgment in showing there was no contract, agreement, or transaction between it and Taggart
or Allen.
Draw may assert a claim for fees under 12-120(3) due to Intermountain's pleading
requesting fees under the same statute. However, the Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that a
pleading for fees is not a judicial admission of fact; rather, the question of whether a case
arises from a commercial transaction is purely a question of law for the Court to determine.
Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., Inc., 152 Idaho 741, 744, 274 P.3d 1256, 1269 (2012)(footnote 8).

The district court erred in determining there was a commercial transaction between
Intermountain and Draw. An award of attorney fees under 12-120(3) to Draw was
inappropriate.
As a matter of law, the district court's judgment awarding fees to Draw must be
vacated.
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C.

Intermountain is entitled to an award of costs on appeal.
In accordance with LA.R. 41 and 35(b)(5), Intermountain requests on appeal an

award of its costs.

CONCLUSION

The district court's Memorandum Decision and Order on Summary Judgment should
be vacated together with the subsequent certified Final Judgment and amended judgment
awarding fees.
The case should be remanded to the district court with directions to consider
application ofLC. § 45-501 to Intermountain's complaint to foreclose its materialmen's lien
against Draw's parcel.
Dated this -L.6 day of December 2012.

~Y124~v

Kipp L. Manwaring
Attorney for Appellant
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